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Abstract
This paper reports the results of behavioral economic experiments conducted in Peru to ex-
amine the relationship amongst risk preferences, loan take-up, and insurance purchase decisions.
This area-based yield insurance can help reduce people's vulnerability to large scale covariate
shocks, and can also lower the loan default probability under extreme negative covariate shocks.
In a context of collateralized formal credit markets, we provide suggestive evidence that insur-
ance may help reduce the fear of losing collateral that prevents potential borrowers from taking
loans. Framing these experiments to recreate a real life situation, we started with a Baseline
Game where subjects had to choose between a fallback production project and an uninsured
loan.We then introduced a third project choice|loan with yield insurance (Insurance Game)|
which allows us to measure the eect of introducing insurance on the demand for loans. Overall,
more than 50 percent of the subjects are willing to buy insurance in this insurance game. Fur-
ther, controling for choices made in the baseline game, covariate shocks experienced earlier, and
previous rounds' winnings, we nd that the decision to take the insured loan (uninsured loan)
rather than any of the other two projects is predicted by wealth and lower (higher) levels of risk
aversion. Interestingly, this relationship with risk aversion continues to hold when we control
for the overweighting of low-probability events observed in the data.
Keywords: area-yield insurance, credit, covariate risk, idiosyncratic risk, risk aversion, prob-
ability weighting, experimental economics, Peru.
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1 Introduction
Risk is widespread in less developed economies, where low-income people from rural areas are
exposed to several potentially catastrophic hazards, such as severe weather events, in addition to
a series of idiosyncratic shocks that periodically aect them. In order to manage and deal with
risk, those people have used a series of ex-ante and ex-post strategies1 over a long time with less
than desired results. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that, despite the substantial eorts to reduce
their vulnerability to negative economic shocks, consumption variability at the individual level still
remains high in the developing world (Dercon, 2005; Morduch, 1995). Depending on the nature and
magnitude of those shocks, this lack of appropriate equipment may lead people to chronic poverty,
thus aecting their possibilities to engage in an economically viable growth path.2
In addition to individual specic eorts displayed to handle risk, innovative nancial products,
such as microloans and index-based insurance, have been designed and implemented from the supply
side, in order to reduce low-income people's vulnerability to extreme economic shocks. On the one
hand, in the wake of the so-called micronance revolution, poor people, typically unable to oer
collateral, have become eligible to get credit access and take advantage of business opportunities,
while on the other hand insurance written on average aggregate indices has emerged with the
promise to help households keep valuable assets which could otherwise be lost as a result of extreme
negative shocks.
But, even though some formal lenders may relax their collateral requirements to grant loans,
potential borrowers may still decide to withdraw from the credit market because they fear losing
collateral in case of default.3 In such a context, index-based insurance that protects producers from
large covariate shocks and reduces the likelihood of loan default, could contribute to expand credit
markets, by reducing the proportion of risk rationed producers.
To which extent insurance can help expand credit markets in less developed countries is an
empirical question that has not suciently been investigated. With only a few index-based insur-
ance programs operating in less developed countries, the literature on the credit-index insurance
linkage is at best scant. With the exceptions of Cole et al. (2008), who studied the obstacles to a
wider insurance take up in India, Gine and Yang (2009), who analyzed whether rainfall insurance
can help increase demand for loans in a randomized control trial in Malawi, Gine et al. (2009),
who designed experiments in urban Peru to test the demand for dierent micronance contracts in
urban Peru, and Lybbert (2006), who designed experiments in Morocco to elicit willingness to pay
for seeds that increase yields, reduce yields variance or yields skewness, to our knowledge no other
work has addressed, directly or indirectly, the issues that concern this paper.
This paper uses a unique experimental data set gathered in rural Peru, where we set up an
1Risk management, ex-ante strategies, may include income diversication, savings, insurance, participation in
rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs); while risk coping, ex-post strategies, may include the use of
informal loans, liquidation of assets, and reallocation of labor, among others.
2The literature on poverty has documented this case, in which when households fall below certain threshold|the
Micawber Frontier|their prospects to escape from poverty are negligible (Carter and Barrett, 2006).
3The magnitude of this withdrawal from credit markets, a result coined risk rationing, is empirically relevant in
Peru, Honduras, and Nicaragua, where risk rationed borrowers account for between 12-19 percent of the total sample
of borrowers (Boucher et al., 2008)
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experimental economics laboratory and run games to examine the nature and main predictors of
the demand for loans and index-based insurance (we label these behavioral experiments \farming
games"4); in particular, we examine the eect of risk preferences, estimated in Galarza (2009), on
the decision to purchase insurance. These experimental sessions were conducted with the same set
of subjects as the risk experiment. This research project was carried out in partnership with an
insurance company in Peru and a vendor of insurance contracts bundled with loans in our research
site (the Pisco valley). In our sessions, we emphasized the fact that our participation as researchers
was simply intended to inform farmers about the main features of this new nancial product
and to examine their willingness to buy it. We also stressed the fact that participating in these
sessions should not make them feel obliged to buy insurance. Our farming games simulated farming
decisions where our experimental subjects had to choose among alternative cotton production
projects: fallback (low return, or safe), produce with an uninsured loan (high return, or risky), or
produce with an insured loan (loan bundled with insurance, less risky). Project choices were made
after knowing the prots associated with each project, at particular realizations of two random
variables: a covariate shock (represented by the valley-wide average yield), and an idiosyncratic
shock.
The behavioral experiments started with a baseline game, where farmers had to choose between
the rst two production projects|fallback and uninsured loan|in a series of repeated rounds.
Using survey data from the Pisco valley, the uninsured loan project was designed so that under
a very low realization of the valley-wide average yield, repayment is not possible regardless of
the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. In these games, by construction, not repaying a loan
has two consequences: no future loans are granted, and the land depreciates.5 After running the
baseline game, we introduced the third production project (insured loan). This new, insurance
game allows us to test whether this new project aects farmers' choice between the safe and the
risky project. Since this insured loan project guarantees full repayment of loans at every realization
of the covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, we could expect that producers having fear of defaulting
in the baseline game (i.e., those risk rationed6) would be more likely to select the insured loan when
it is available. And that is precisely what we found, as we report below.
Our sample includes 378 experimental subjects from rural Peru.7 Surveys conducted with
our subjects provided information about the prior knowledge of insurance, willingness to pay for
insurance at several premium levels, and ex-post measures of learning about the main features of
the uninsured and insured loans. The analysis performed in this paper considers the choices made
in the last round where a farmer had a chance to learn during the high stakes rounds, which could
be the last high-stake round (if no loan default happened) or that immediately before the one in
4The terms \experiments" and \games" are used interchangeably throughtout the text.
5This consequence is intended to replicate the penalty that a defaulting borrower would face in terms of having
seized his or her land.
6Following Boucher et al. (2008), we consider risk rationed to be those subjects who chose to do the safe, fallback
project instead of the uninsured loan project during the baseline game, as we assume they did so because they did
not want to run the dynamic risk that implies defaulting on a loan.
7We had originally 409 subjects showing up to the experiments, 385 of them completed all the activities in the
experimental sessions, and we have most of the individual specic information for 378 of them.
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which a subject defaulted a loan.
Our ndings are as follows. First, the experimentally-measured demand for valley-wide average
yield insurance is fairly high: 57 percent of farmers demanded the insured loan project by the last
two high-stake rounds, a proportion that remains rather steady during all the high stakes rounds.
Second, experimental evidence suggests that index yield insurance, by reducing the likelihood of
loan defaults, may crowd-in credit markets by a sizeable proportion. We nd that 57 percent
of the subjects who chose the fallback, safe project (i.e., 24 percent of the total subjects) in the
baseline game switched to the insured loan project during the insurance game. This result suggests
that insurance would allow almost 14 percent of the total number of subjects not to withdraw
from the credit market.8 While it is clear that such estimated magnitude may not be accurate, it is
suggestive that insurance could encourage the undertaking of riskier but potentially more protable
production projects thanks to new funds coming from a loan.
Third, in regards to the predictors of insurance (or the insured loan) \purchase" in the insurance
game, controlling for choices made in the baseline game and a source of judgment bias, we nd that
wealth appears correlated with a greater likelihood of choosing the insured loan, while static risk
preferences estimated assuming a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function under Expected
Utility Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory|which adds a parameter measuring subjective
distortions to actual probabilities|enter the regression with a negative coecient. We argue that
this seemingly counterintuitive result may be explained by the fact that higher risk averse subjects
are found to be signicantly less likely to have understood the intertemporal and dynamic benets
of insurance, thus being less likely to choose the insured loan. This result oers novel evidence
about the relationship between risk aversion and preferences for innovative nancial instruments.
With the emergence of eld experiments as a tool increasingly used in development economics,9 a
great deal of studies have been carried out with the aim to examine the impact of policy interventions
on people's well-being. However, unlike randomized control trials, which analyze the eects of an
intervention by comparing a randomly assigned treatment group with a similarly random control
group, a relatively small number of behavioral experiments use a payos structure to incentivize
subjects to reveal their true preferences. This paper analyzes the results of an experiment of the
latter type, an approach that appeals to us as being an eective tool to build people's comprehension
of a new nancial product and subsequently measure their willingness to buy it. We thus see this
paper as contributing a novel methodology to experimentally examine the relationship between the
decision to take a loan, to purchase insurance, and risk preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our experimental design
in the context of related works. Section 3 describes the experimental procedures followed and the
data used; and also presents a descriptive analysis of the results. Section 4 analyzes the main
econometric results and Section 5 concludes.
8After this round in default, farmers are left with no choice but to do the fallback project. The quantitative
importance of this nding increases to about 20 percent when we use the modal choice during the high-stake rounds.
9This is particularly true in the case of randomized control trials. Banerjee and Duo (2008) conduct a thorough
review of the main advantages and criticisms of these methods used in economics.
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2 Related Studies and Our Experimental Design
In this section, we review the related literature (section 2.1) and then discuss the distinctive features
of our experimental design in that context (section 2.2). Using the terminology coined by Harrison
and List (2004), our farming games are framed eld experiments, as they concern valuations over a
real commodity (cotton) and involve tasks similar to those performed by the experimental subjects
in real life.
2.1 Related Studies
Although in recent years eld experiments in development have analyzed a wide gamut of topics,
there still remains much to do in terms of applying the laboratory experimental tools to analyze de-
velopment issues. In a survey of the literature about experiments conducted in developing countries,
Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) report that three of the main topics studied are the measurement
of trust, cooperation, and risk. More recent behavioral eld experiments have involved testing the
demand for micronance contracts (Gine et al., 2009) and the willingness to pay for seeds that
stabilize yield distributions (Lybbert, 2006), in both cases using hypothetical payos. Finally, we
report two randomized control trials that examine the demand for weather-based insurance in India
and Malawi, respectively (Cole et al., 2008; Gine and Yang, 2009).
Lybbert (2006) uses a payos structure in order to incentivize farmers in India to elicit their
preferences about three desirable properties of cotton seeds: an increase in yields, a reduction in
yields variance, and a reduction in yields skewness. Using the Becker-DeGroot-Marchak method
(Becker et al., 1964) to elicit the maximum willingness to pay for those traits, where farmers were
given the payo distributions related to each type of seed before making their bid,10 the study shows
that farmers value seeds that increase the expected returns, but no evidence was found about their
valuation of the other two traits of seeds. As Lybbert acknowledges, the lack of valuation of yield
risk reduction (i.e., less variance) may be explained by the inability of the experimental design to
control for the relevant factors that aect farmer's valuation of crop yield distributions. Lybbert's
results further show no statistically strong relationship between any individual characteristic (such
as wealth) and expected returns, a result that Lybbert claims could be due to the existence of
credit constraints.
In a randomized control trial in Malawi, Gine and Yang (2009) investigate whether insurance
can induce farmers to take loans to adopt a new, high-yielding seed variety. The control group of
subjects was oered a loan to purchase a high-yielding seed; while the treatment group was oered
an identical loan contract and was required to buy actuarially fair rainfall-indexed insurance if they
took the loan. This insurance can allow them to partially or fully repay the loan, depending on how
low the rainfall is. Thus while assuming a risk averse behavior, one could expect insured farmers to
10Once farmers bid a price, a random seed price was drawn from a uniform distribution with mean of 50 Rupees
(Rs.). Thus, if farmers bid at least the amount of the randomly drawn price, they could get the seed and \plant
it", and get the corresponding payo. After this, farmers draw a chip from a bag to determine the season's harvest
payo. Thus, for a farmer who planted the seed, his net earnings would be the harvest payo, minus the price paid
for the seed, plus 50 Rs. (o-farm earnings), while for one who did not plant the seed, it would be only the 50 Rs.
corresponding to the o-farm earnings.
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be more willing to take out a loan in order to undertake a potentially more protable investment
(buying the high-yielding seed), Gine and Yang nd exactly the opposite result: loan take-up rates
are much lower for the treatment group (17.6 percent versus 33.0 percent). These authors suggest
that the low insured loan take-up could be due to the prior existence of limited liability; that is, the
actual consequences of defaulting on a loan might not have been so severe in the rst place, and
thus the actual value of buying insurance would be reduced. In the same vein, Cole et al.'s (2008)
randomized control trials in two Indian States aim to identify the barriers to a wider adoption of
rainfall insurance. They nd that subjects' purchase rates are very price elastic, and that cash
constraints seem to play a role in insurance adoption. More interestingly, they nd that third party
endorsement (such as that of a local authority) of insurance can aect its take-up.
Our behavioral experiment shares some features in common with the previously discussed works,
but it arguably oers a more complete picture of how rural producers take decisions in real life.
In particular, our experiment focuses on examining the interrelationship among three themes:
agricultural yields, loan, and insurance. In our farming games, loans allow to get higher expected
yields (i.e., a more protable production), and insurance eliminates the possibility of defaulting a
loan, thus securing the farm production and ensuring farmers to keep the option of requesting loans
in the future. Written on valley-wide yields, this insurance protects producers from catastrophic
events that dramatically reduce average yields at the valley level. Subjects' farming prots depend
on two random variables: a covariate shock|represented by the valley-wide average yield|that
aects equally all subjects in the same valley, and an idiosyncratic shock, uncorrelated with the
covariate shock.
Moreover, while our farming experiments are close in spirit to the randomized control trials
conducted by Gine and Yang (2009), we used actual payos to incentivize players to elicit their
preferences for distinct production projects. Moreover, our farming games have greater complexity
than the games of Lybbert (2006) in that our farmers' payos for each project choice depend on two
sources of randomness, while in Lybbert's games there is only a random \yield risk" that subjects
should consider before deciding their choice (a seed). Likewise, our farming games introduce addi-
tional complexity to the typical individual loan games, in which players have to choose whether to
request a loan with a risky result, or to invest in a safe project (e.g., Gine et al., 2009), by providing
subjects a more complete set of nancial instruments to nance their production. Obviously, the
greater complexity in the design of our games increases the challenges for ensuring experimental
control. In the next section, we discuss the experimental design of our games.
2.2 Our Farming Games
The game script for our farming games was written following standard experimental procedures as
close as possible (Davis and Holt, 1993). Game trials were conducted in Madison and Davis in the
U.S. (with graduate students), and Lima (with social scientists and cotton farmers), and the valley
of Pisco and its neighbor Ica (with cotton farmers), in Peru. The nal version of the script was
reviewed by a journalist who works closely with farmers, in order to ensure that the language used
in the instructions would be understandable to a typical farmer.
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The farming games were designed to estimate the potential demand for index-based crop in-
surance and examine the eects of using insurance on the demand for loans. In these games,
we simulated farming decisions where subjects, endowed with a \hectare of land", had to choose
among alternative cotton production projects|fallback (safe project), take an uninsured loan (risky
project), and take a loan bundled with index yield insurance (insured loan, less risky project)11|in
a series of repeated rounds.
Each project yields a related prot, which is known to subjects before they make their decisions.
In the cases of the uninsured loan and insured loan projects, prots depend additively on the
realization of two random variables: a covariate shock (represented by the valley-wide average yield),
and an idiosyncratic shock. The probability distributions of both shocks were estimated using
information from the Pisco valley. In particular, detrended 1986-2006 time series data of valley
yields (yt), expressed in Kilograms per hectare, were tted to a Weibull density function; the
parameters of the Weibull function were estimated using maximum likelihood in Gauss:12
yt Weibull (6.00, 1806.08). (1)
The distribution of valley yields has a mean of 1,674 Kilograms per hectare. In turn, four-year
(2002-2005) panel data were used to estimate the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks (it),
13
using the following xed eects model:
yit   i = i(yt   ) + it; (2)
which regresses the farmer i's yields (yi) deviation from its mean, i, on the deviation of the
sample's average yields (yt) from its mean ().
We then discretized the densities of valley yields; yt
14 (Weibull), and idiosyncratic shocks, it
(Normal centered on zero), in order to simulate the eects of distinct realizations of those shocks
on prots. In particular, we divided the density of yt into ve sections|labeled as very low,
low, normal, high, very high|with the following probabilities (in percent): 10, 20, 40, 20, and
10. After the estimations above, we converted all yield gures to quintals (QQ)15 (1 quintal = 46
Kilograms), a denomination familiar to our subjects. Thus, the valley yield values, yt, corresponding
to the mid-point of those sections are (in rounded gures): 23, 30, 37, 43, and 48 quintals per
hectare, respectively. Analogously, the density of it was divided into three sections|labeled as
bad, normal,16 and good|with the following probabilities: 25, 50, and 25. Thus, the deviations
from the \normal" category are expressed as it. In particular, the mid-point of the \bad" luck
11Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms fallback, and safe project; the terms unisured loan and
risky project, and the terms insured loan and loan bundled with yield insurance project.
12We used the Broyden{Fletcher{Goldfarb{Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. The parameters' standard deviations are
1.03 and 70.17.
13This is also a measure of the uninsured or basis risk uncovered.by insurance.
14Note that y represents the valley average yield, while y refers to the sample average used to estimate the
idiosyncratic shocks.
15A Quintal is equivalent to 100 pounds, which is in turn roughly equivalent to 46 Kilograms.
16The \Normal" categories of those shocks lie roughly at the center of their respective densities.
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category lies {12.12 percent (below) the center of the distribution of , while the mid-point of the
\good" luck category lies 11.63 percent above the center of the distribution.
To compute farmer i's per hectare prots in Soles from the insured and uninsured loan projects
at each section of the valley yield and idiosyncratic shock densities, we used the following formula:
projectit = (p  yit)  (1 + it)  (1 + r)Loan+ p  Indemnity   premium; (3)
where the price (p) of a quintal of cotton is set at 124.2 Soles, the loan size (Loan) used is 2,464
Soles (equivalent to US$800 at the time of conducting the experiment), and the interest rate (r)
was set at 30 percent (the going rate at that time).17 Insurance contract is written on 85 percent of
the average valley yields, equivalent to 31 quintals per hectare (=1,674/46 = 36.4 x 0.85)18 and the
premium was set at 150 Soles per insured hectare.19 Thus, the Indemnity (expressed in quintals
per hectare) in period t is dened as I (yt < 31)  (31   yt), where I() is the indicator function.
This indexed Insurance thus covers any shortfall in valley average yields below the 31 quintals per
hectare, as depicted by the solid line in Figure 1, where we also plot the estimated Weibull density
of the average valley yields. The indemnity function for the 100 percent contract (dotted line),
with a strike yield of 36.4 quintals per hectare, is also pictured for comparison.
Figure 1: Indemnity and Valley Yield Density Functions for Pisco
20 30 40 50 60
Cotton Yields, Quintals
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
In
de
m
ni
fic
at
io
n 
P
ay
m
en
ts
, S
ol
es
/h
ec
ta
re
Y
ie
ld
s 
D
en
si
ty
100% Strike Point
85% Strike Point
Estimated Probability Distribution
for Average Yields
Furthermore, in order to simplify the implementation of the experiment, we considered the
case of the typical farmer (i.e., i = 1), which basically implies a one-to-one relationship between
17These parameters used consider the going prices at the time the experiment was implemented.
18This strike yield was set after game trials in Pisco, where most subjects preferred the 85 percent strike yield over
the 65 percent and 90 percent strike yields.
19This premium includes a mark-up or load of 40 percent over the actuarially fair price (107 Soles per hectare).
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farmer's yields (yit) and actual average valley yields (yt), using the expression indicated in eqn.[2].
The gures of individual yields used in the prot function in eqn.[3] then correspond to the mid-
point value of the valley yields at every section of its density (23, 30, 37, 43, and 48 quintals per
hectare, going from \very low" to \very high" yields): yit = yt. The resulting prot gures were
rounded to the nearest 50.
For the fallback project, prots were adjusted accordingly to get lower but more stable prots
than in the uninsured loan case.20 We will discuss the characteristics of the resulting prots for
each project in the next section.
As mentioned earlier, our behavioral experiments consisted in a sequence of two sets of games.
We started with a baseline game, where farmers had to opt for either the fallback or the uninsured
loan project. And then, we continued with an insurance game, where a third alternative project
(loan bundled with yield insurance, or insured loan) was included in the set of choices. This
sequential structure of the experiments allows us to examine any changes in farmers' choices between
the rst two projects after the introduction of insurance.
An important characteristic of the uninsured loan project is that when the valley average yield
is very low, the farming income is not sucient to repay the loan, regardless of the idiosyncratic
shock. Defaulting on a loan involves two negative consequences in the experiment: no future access
to credit and a 50 percent decrease in the value of the \endowed" land.21 On the other hand, the
(85 percent) insurance contract guarantees the full repayment of loans at every realization of the
valley average yield and the idiosyncratic shock, thus allowing farmers to keep the option to choose
the uninsured loan project in the future and to preserve their land value.
In the next section, we describe in detail the procedures followed in the implementation of these
farming experiments.
3 Experimental Procedures and Data
Our experimental design faced two major challenges: to explain clearly the notion of probabilities
associated with the dierent sections of the two shocks' densities, and to ensure a minimum level
of comprehension of the insured and uninsured loan projects. We responded to those challenges by
using transparent randomizing devices to simulate the realizations of the covariate shocks (colored
chips) and idiosyncratic shocks (colored ping-pong balls), which were referred to as \individual
luck" in order to denote the individual characteristics uncorrelated among subjects within a given
valley. These shocks were drawn from sacks containing 10 chips (1 black, 2 red, 4 white, 2 blue, and
1 green)|the \valley sack"|and 4 balls (1 purple, 2 white, and 1 yellow)|the \luck sack"|which
reproduce the probability structure mentioned earlier, going from the worst to the best outcome.
Furthermore, in each of the experiment worksheets presented to our subjects, we reminded subjects
the information about the probabilities under each scenario of the covariate shock and idiosyncratic
shock by spacing columns and rows, respectively, in a roughly proportional manner. In addition,
20We further assumed a symmetric distribution for the idiosyncratic shock around the mean of zero.
21The value of (a hectare of) land was set at 2,400 Soles. The reduction of this value to 1,200 Soles is meant to
simulate the penalty that would occur after defaulting on a collateralized loan.
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we included pictures of the actual colored chips and balls associated with each scenario. Table 1
shows a sample worksheet used for the insured loan project, labeled as project C, in the actual
experiments. A similar design, also printed in color, was used for the other projects' worksheets.
We will discuss the prots' gures later.
Table 1: Sample Game Worksheet used for Project C
Secondly, in order to enhance comprehension of the procedures, eld assistants explained our
subjects how the combination of a covariate shock and an idiosyncratic shock drawn determined
the prots of the project chosen in every decision round, where each round represented a farming
season. The monitor, in charge of giving the instructions to all participants as a group, further
illustrated the rules and procedures with examples. We also allowed participants to ask questions
during the course of the presentation of the instructions.22 We were aware of the risks of doing
this, but we actually did not receive questions that may have induced players to play in a certain
way.23
The experiment instructions were read aloud in Spanish by the same monitor in every session.
The monitor used a projector to present the information about the types of shocks, the projects'
characteristics and the sequence of the actions subjects should follow in each decision round. The
contents of those slides are provided in Appendix A.24 At the beginning of every session, all par-
ticipants received a binder containing the worksheets with the information of the projects' prots
related to each type of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, as well as a pencil to record their choices,
the type of shocks realized, and the resulting prots in each simulated farming season. Helping
subjects to see the connection between their choices, types of shocks drawn, and resulting prots,
was also intended to enhance trust in our calculations of their game winnings.
The farming experiment lasted three hours on average. Total game winnings in cash from
22Key moments at which we specically asked if they had any questions were: at the end of the project description,
and before the low- and high-stake rounds.
23Most of the questions asked concerned the reasons for the dierences in payos from particular projects under
certain realizations of shocks; whether yield insurance covered losses due to hazards at the irrigation sector level; the
source of the (agricultural production, cost, and valley yield) gures used for our analysis; whether the indemnity
payments could be sucient to repay the loan; or the timing of the insurance payouts; and the like.
24Out of the 24 sessions held, only in three of them we used posters containing the same information as in the
slides for a short time. The monitor used sixteen slides to explain the farming and risk games.
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participating in this particular experiment ranged from 11 to 26 Soles, with average winnings of
17 Soles (equivalent to $6). Game winnings and attendance fees were paid at the end of the
entire session|which also included the conduct of the risk experiment (whose results are reported
in Galarza [2009]), and pre-experiment and post-experiment surveys|that lasted on average ve
hours.25
Recall that in all of our 24 conducted sessions, participants were assigned to numbered seats at
random upon arrival, and we divided the participants into at most four \valleys" with a minimum
of 3 members in each one. Splitting subjects this way allowed us to get more variability in the
realizations of the covariate shocks, to have a closer monitoring, and to accelerate the tasks. Two
persons from our eld team were in charge of each valley. A senior assistant, well versed in the
game rules and procedures, recorded the players' choices and prots, and did the entry and exit
surveys, while a helper assisted with the drawing of the covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.
Let us consider now the structure of prots associated with each type of covariate and id-
iosyncratic shock that was shown to our subjects. Table 2 reports the prots calculated without
considering the probability of losing land. As seen in the table, the uninsured loan project (labeled
as project A) has higher, but more volatile, expected prots than the other two projects; with the
fallback project (project B) being the least protable project in expectation and the one with the
lowest standard deviation (the safest). More specically, the mean prots of the projects are: 1,355
(project A), 735 (project B), and 1,283 (project C), while their standard deviations|reported in
Table 3, columns 2 to 4|are 859, 331, and 767, respectively.
On the other hand, considering the probability of losing land (i.e., of losing 1,200 Soles when
project A is chosen and a very low valley yield is realized) in the prots' calculation, the mean
prot of the insured loan project becomes now the largest. We should mention, however, that this
eect was rather hidden in the experiment, and most likely our subjects did not consider their land
value (or at least not to its full extent) in the calculations of prots of the dierent projects. To
make the gures comparable with those shown in the prior table, we only changed the prots for
project A under the very low average yield (reported a net loss of {1,200 instead of 0), while in the
other two projects, no land losses are realized. As a result, while yield insurance only decreases
from 859 to 767 the standard deviation of prots26 when no land losses are considered (see columns
2 and 4 of Table 3), we can see a much greater reduction in volatility when land losses are included
in the prots calculation (from 1,099 to 767 in their standard deviations27). While we can easily
notice that the expected benets from buying insurance would be even greater in an intertemporal
context, in which the land not lost would yield potentially greater prots, we believe that this eect
was poorly perceived by our subjects.28
25After the farming games, a risk game, which lasted about 30 minutes on average, was run. The rest of the
time|one hour and a half|was spent conducting the entry and exit surveys.
26To see more clearly the magnitude in the reduction of prots' risk, this implies a reduction from 0.63 to 0.60 in
the coecient of variation of prots.
27Which implies a substantial reduction in the coecient of variation from 0.89 to 0.60 due to insurance.
28One interesting extension, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would be to consider that farmers use
decision weights instead of objective probabilities in their expected calculations and to examine the ranking of mean
and standard deviation of those projects.
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Table 2: Farming Game Prots
(Expressed in Soles per hectare)
Valley-Wide Average Yield
Very Low Low Normal High Very High Mean
(23 QQ) (30 QQ) (37 QQ) (43 QQ) (48 QQ)
[0.10 ] [0.20 ] [0.40 ] [0.20 ] [0.10 ]
Project A: Produce cotton with loan (uninsured loan)
L Bad [0.25 ] 0 1 250 800 1,350 2,000 840
u Normal [0.50 ] 0 1 600 1,400 2,100 2,700 1,370
c Good [0.25 ] 0 1 900 1,900 2,800 3,400 1,840
k Mean 0 588 1,375 2,088 2,700 1,355
Project B: Produce cotton without a loan (fallback)
L Bad [0.25 ] 300 400 600 900 1,350 665
u Normal [0.50 ] 350 450 650 1,000 1,500 735
c Good [0.25 ] 400 500 700 1,100 1,650 805
k Mean 350 450 650 1,000 1,500 735
Project C: Produce cotton with a loan & insurance (insured loan)
L Bad [0.25 ] 150 150 650 1,200 1,850 730
u Normal [0.50 ] 500 500 1,250 1,950 2,550 1,295
c Good [0.25 ] 850 850 1,750 2,650 3,250 1,810
k Mean 500 500 1,225 1,938 2,550 1,283
Note: Subjects were shown this table, except for the averages and probabilities.
1 The values of unpaid debts were 700 (Bad luck), 350 (normal luck), and 50 (good luck).
Thus, instead of focusing on expected prots, we will argue that risk aversion considerations
could better guide an ordering in preferences. One could then state that as risk aversion goes up,
subjects would tend to switch from the uninsured loan (A) to the insured loan project (C), and then
to the fallback project (B). This ordering, which also corresponds to the ranking according to the
standard deviation of the three projects' prots shown in Table 3, will be used in the econometric
analysis performed in Section 4.
Turning now to the experiment procedures followed, as mentioned above, our farming games
involved selecting cotton production projects in a repeated fashion. These experiments started
with the baseline game, and continued with the insurance game. As is customary in experimental
economics, each of those games started with a set of (six) \low stakes" rounds, intended to get
subjects familiar with the game rules and procedures, which were followed by a set of (six) \high
stakes" rounds. Further, subjects knew that all sets of rounds would end with the sixth one.29
In the baseline game, subjects chose between the fallback (which we labeled as project B: cotton
without a loan) and the uninsured loan (which we labeled as project A: cotton with a loan) projects.
29After several game trials, we chose six rounds because it showed to have sucient variability in the covariate
shocks. In particular, we were interested in getting a very bad valley-wide averge yield in each six-round campaign,
so that farmers would learn rst hand the consequences of choosing the loan project.
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Table 3: Farming Game Payos: Mean and Standard Deviation
(Expressed in Soles per hectare)
Without losing land Losing land1
Project A Project B Project C Project A Project B Project C
Mean 1,355 735 1,283 1,235 735 1,283
Standard Dev. 859 331 767 1,099 331 767
Ordering considering:
Mean 1st 3rd 2nd 2nd 3rd 1st
Std. Dev. 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd
1 Only the prots from project A under the very low valley yield changed (from 0 to -1,200).
The sequence of events in each round of play, t, was as follows:
(i) All players selected their favorite projects;
(ii) (starting clockwise in each valley, v) one player drew a covariate shock (represented by a
colored chip) from the valley sack. Players rotated this picking-the-chip role;
(iii) then each player i drew his or her own idiosyncratic shock or \luck" (colored ball) from the
luck sack;
(iv) our assistants explained the prot corresponding to the triplet fproject chosenivt, covariate
shockvt, idiosyncratic shockivtg to each subject.
Once the six rounds were played, one of them was randomly chosen for play by having a
participant in each valley roll a six-sided die. We used this random incentive design in order to
preserve the proper incentives to carefully select every choice. This selection criterion of the round
for play was reminded to all subjects at the beginning of each set of six rounds.
Furthermore, in order to include the eects of losing collateral into the decision-making, the
total game payos included the value of the endowed land at the end of the every set of six rounds,
in addition to the game prots obtained from the project chosen. In order to determine the nal
land value, we used the following rule: regardless of which round was chosen for play, as long as
in any of them the following combination funinsured loan; black chip, any colored ballg
resulted, farmers were paid half of the original land price.30
The low-stake rounds were followed by a set of six \high-stake" rounds, where subjects started
again with a clean slate: full access to loans, and a hectare of land with its original value. The
procedures and rules were exactly the same as we described earlier, and the only change was
the increase in 100 percent in the exchange rate to compute the winnings in cash, as a way to
incentivize more careful decisions. Thus, now for every 600 game Soles of payos (prot + land
value), participants would receive 1 Sol in cash. Subjects learned their winnings in cash at the end
of each set of six rounds.
30The reduction in the value of land tries to capture the consequences of defaulting a loan, in terms of reducing
the future expected gains. Anecdotal evidence from Pisco suggests that seizing the land is not a frequent procedure
in the formal or informal credit markets even if the lender has a mortgage in hands.
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After playing the baseline game, the insurance game, consisting of a new set of 12 rounds where
the insured loan project (project C) was added to the set of choices, was played. In this new
game, the rules and procedures followed, and exchange rates used were exactly the same as the
ones described above. We emphasized with subjects that the results from the baseline game (i.e.,
whether subjects' defaulted on a loan or not) did not carry over to the insurance game. Written on
85 percent of the long-run average valley yields, insurance pays out indemnities when valley yields
fall below 31 quintals per hectare; i.e., when valley yields are \low" (30 quintals per hectare) or
\very low" (23 quintals per hectare), which will happen when a black chip or a red chip are drawn
in a valley. We should note in Table 2 that, since indemnity payouts cover exactly the shortfalls
under those sections of the distribution, the amount of the prots are the same for every category
of idiosyncratic shock (150, 500 and 850).
3.1 Descriptive Analysis of Experiment Results
Before we examine the characteristics of our subjects in the baseline and insurance games, we
should mention that our typical experimental subject is older than 50 (half of which has been
spent managing a farm), has only completed elementary education (six years of schooling), owns 6
hectares, sows 5 of them, and holds assets for twenty thousand Soles (about $7,000), as shown in
Table C.1 in the Appendix. Further, 66 percent of our subjects have access to any type of credit,
and they exhibit a moderate to high risk aversion. We will examine more closely these variables
later.
This section examines the main characteristics exhibited by our subjects in the Baseline Game
and in the Insurance Game, as a means to provide clues for the econometric analysis of the main
predictors of insurance take-up performed in the next section (Section 4). Since we are interested
in capturing the choices that contain the most information possible, the following analysis will use
the last high stakes round at which subjects stopped learning about the dierent projects, which
is the last high stakes round (if subjects did not fall in default) or the round immediately prior to
the one in which subjects fell in default (given that immediately after that round, subjects are only
left with the fallback project). We call this round the nal unconstrained round.31
Table 4 shows one of our major results, the matrix of project choices made by subjects in
the baseline game (indicated in rows) and in the insurance game (in columns). We observe at
the bottom of column 5 that a large proportion (57 percent) of the experimental subjects chose
the insured loan project, a proportion that was similar in all of the high stakes rounds. (The
average number of switches in project choices is 0.80, with a standard deviation of 1.31.) Another
interesting result is that purchasing insurance would encourage almost 14 percent (52 out of 378)
of subjects to opt for a loan instead of producing using their own resources (see cell fB,Cg in the
matrix), thanks to the reduction in the likelihood of default implied by insurance. Another lecture
of the same gure indicates that about 60 percent (52 out of 91) of the risk rationed subjects (i.e.,
those who chose the fallback project in the baseline game32) switched to the insured loan project
31During the rst high stake round of the insurance game, 2.6 percent of subjects went into default.
32Obviously, we are assuming here that these subjects are risk rationed in real life, a result that may not necessarily
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when it was available. This is one of the intended eects of insurance: to encourage farmers to
undertake riskier but potentially more protable projects.
We can further see in the table that a relatively small proportion of subjects made choices
inconsistent with transitivity in preferences (34 out of 378, or 9 percent). In particular, 20 out
of 91 subjects who selected the fallback project over the uninsured loan project in the baseline
game (cell fB,Ag) switched to the uninsured loan project in the insurance game, and 14 out of 287
subjects who chose the uninsured loan in the baseline game (cell fA,Bg) switched to the fallback
project in the insurance game. Note that since we are working with the nal unconstrained rounds,
these choices were made before any bad year (i.e., a black chip drawn in a round) happened when
the uninsured loan was selected, and thereby they are likely to reect their true preferences.33
Table 4: Choices in Baseline and Insurance Games
Insurance Game
Uninsured loan Fallback Insured loan Total %
(A) (B) (C)
Uninsured loan (A) 109 14 164 287 75.9
% 38.0 4.9 57.0 100.0
Fallback (B) 20 19 52 91 24.1
% 22.0 20.9 57.1 100.0
Total 129 33 216 378 100.0
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% 34.1 8.7 57.1 100.0
Before we discuss the main distinctive characteristics of subjects in the baseline and insurance
games, we need to dene one of our major variables of interest: nancial literacy. In constructing
a measure of the degree of comprehension of the main features of the insured and uninsured loans,
we included four topics: (i) self-reported comprehension of the farming game rules (variable Self-
report), (ii) whether subjects knew (reminded) that insurance indemnity payouts depend on valley-
wide average yields (Learn ins1 ) and (iii) not on idiosyncratic shocks (Learn ins2 ), and (iv) whether
they knew the two consequences of defaulting on a loan (Learn loan). We assigned the same weights
to each of these variables:
Financial literacy = (Self -report+ Learn Ins1 + Learn Ins2 + Learn Loan)=4;
where Self-report takes the values of 1, 0.75, 0.5, or 0.25 if subjects claimed that the instructions
were \very easy", \easy", \hard", or \very hard", respectively. Learn Ins1 and Learn Ins2 are
indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the answer was correct and 0, otherwise. Learn Loan
takes the value of 1 if the two consequences of defaulting an uninsured loan (i.e., no future access
to loans and land depreciation) were indicated by subjects; 0.5 if only one of those were mentioned;
and 0 otherwise. We then normalized this indicator to take values between 0 (which means that
hold.
33Using the modal choice during the high-stake rounds would result in a take-up rate for the insured (uninsured)
loan of 58.5 percent (24.3 percent), and 37.6 percent of risk rationed subjects, with 57 percent of them switching to
the insured loan in the Insurance Game.
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a subject does not know anything about the rules of the game) and 1 (which indicates that a
subject knows very well the rules). The average value of this indicator across subjects is 0.54,
which indicates an overall moderate level of comprehension.34
We will also examine the results in terms of risk preferences. Such preferences were estimated
from the results of a lottery experiment conducted with the same Pisco subjects, where the data
were tted to Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions under Expected Utility
Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT).35 The estimated average coecients of
CRRA of 0.45 (EUT) and 0.74 (CPT) suggest the existence of a moderate to relatively high degree
of risk aversion. The interested reader is referred to our companion paper (Galarza, 2009) for
details.
We discuss next the main distinctive characteristics of the two groups of subjects in the baseline
game, and then of the three groups of subjects in the insurance game. The results from this section
will provide insights about the variables correlated with the demand for the insured loan that will
be analyzed in Section 4. Recall that, unless otherwise indicated, we will use the nal high stake
round in which farmers had a choice to make (i.e., the nal unconstrained round) in the analysis.
3.1.1 Baseline Game: Risk-Rationed Subjects versus Uninsured Borrowers
Table C.2 in the Appendix shows the means T -tests of selected variables for the two groups in the
baseline game. In particular, we observe that uninsured borrowers include a lower proportion of
females and a bigger owned and cultivated parcel size (by one hectare) than risk-rationed subjects.
The former group also appears to be more connected to agricultural information networks, as
indicated by their bigger number of information partners (i.e., people with whom they exchange
information about farming activities, such as pests control, new seeds, and the like). They also have
a greater access to loans from any source in real life, mainly explained by their greater access to
loans from cotton mills, not from formal lenders. Furthermore, uninsured borrowers show a lower
tendency to overweight small probabilities, meaning that when they are told an event has a small
probability of happening, they act as if such event were to happen with a higher probability.36
We will discuss in more detail the eects of this type of psychological distortion of probability
information in Section 4. For all of the above indicated variables, the dierences in means between
risk-rationed and uninsured borrowers are signicant at either 1 or 5 percent. On the other hand,
while uninsured borrowers have higher nancial literacy, such dierences are barely signicant.
Likewise, the formal education levels and risk aversion estimates shown by those two groups are
34If we excluded the self-reported comprehension variable (self-report), such an indicator would have an average
value of 0.50, and the correlation coecient with education would be 0.37.
35Under EUT, risk preferences are entirely dened by the curvature parameter, while in CPT, a probability weight-
ing function parameter also aects such preferences. This function captures the subjective distortions made to actual
probabilities. More details of the estimation process are provided in Section 4.1.
36To illustrate the notion of overweighting of small probabilities, let us take the case of a lottery, whose chances
of winning its biggest prize is say 0.001. Now, let us consider that subjects transform such 0.001 into a subjective
probability of 0.01; that is, they behave as if they could get the highest prize weere bigger than it actually is. The
consequence of this is that for a given curvature of the utility function, they would behave in a more risk seeking
manner than such curvature would suggest. Levy and Levy (2002) nicely analyze the consequences of probability
weighting on the lotteries' risk premium.
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similar.
In the econometric analysis about the choices made in the insurance game performed in Section
4, we will control for choices made in the baseline game by including as an independent variable the
predicted probability of choosing the fallback project in this game, which will in turn be estimated
as a linear function of gender, age, education, and owned land size variables.
3.1.2 Insurance Game: Insured Borrowers versus the Others
Comparing insured borrowers to uninsured borrowers and risk-rationed producers, Table C.3 in the
Appendix shows that insured borrowers are markedly dierent from the other two groups in several
important respects: demographics, literacy, productivity, assets, risk preferences, as well as market
and social connections.
First, insured borrowers are signicantly younger (by two years) and have higher education
(by one year) than uninsured borrowers; and this gap is even bigger when we compare insureds to
risk-rationed subjects. Second, insured borrowers are also more likely to have better understood
the properties of insurance than the other two groups of subjects, a result reected by their higher
values of the variable Financial Literacy. Third, insureds also report higher cotton yields in the
last farming season (2007-2008), though this dierence is statistically signicant (at 5 percent level)
only when insureds are compared to risk-rationed subjects (the gap is 6 quintals, or 276 Kilograms
per hectare). Fourth, insureds own more valuable assets, denoted by the variable Wealth (that
includes the values of land and house), a result that is mainly explained by their more valuable
houses. In fact, insureds' house values are 50 percent higher than those of uninsured borrowers,
and this gap is even larger when we compare insured to risk-rationed subjects. Furthermore, while
insureds do have signicantly bigger parcels than risk-rationed subjects (by one hectare), such gap
vanishes when we compare insureds to uninsured borrowers.
Fifth, surprisingly, risk-rationed subjects are more risk averse than uninsured borrowers, who
are in turn more risk averse than insured borrowers; and such dierences in risk aversion are
statistically signicant (at 10 percent) under the EUT and the CPT specications. How can we
explain this seemingly counterintuitive result? In particular, why should higher risk averse subjects
choose the uninsured loan instead of the insured loan?: The fact that (higher) risk aversion under
EUT and CPT is highly correlated with a lower education attainment and a lower nancial literacy
suggests that higher risk averse subjects are less likely to have understood the true dynamic benets
from buying crop insurance. Having a relatively poor understanding of this insurance, risk averse
subjects would thus have opted for either the safest (fallback) project or a project they know
relatively well in real life|the uninsured loan.
Sixth, insured borrowers are also more likely to have obtained a loan to nance their agricultural
activities than risk-rationed subjects, but less likely so than uninsured borrowers (signicance at 5
percent level). Seventh, considering the number of experimentally-constructed valley members with
whom an individual shares information about farming activities as an indicator of social connection,
we nd that insured and uninsured borrowers are similarly connected with other farmers|the
agricultural `networks' have on average 1.7 members|while groups belong to a slightly bigger
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agricultural network than risk-rationed farmers. Eighth, the winnings from the low stakes insurance
game are (expectedly) higher for subjects choosing the insured loan than those obtained by subjects
who chose the fallback project. Ninth, overweighting is the greatest for those who chose the fallback
project, and lowest for those choosing the insured loan. Lastly, we do not observe statistically
signicant dierences in terms of gender, farming experience, or belonging to a farmer association
amongst these three groups.
To sum up then, we saw that nancial literacy, wealth, risk preferences, and social network
variables are likely to be correlated with the project choices made in the insurance game, and we
will include those variables in the regression analysis. We discuss in the next section the econometric
methods used in the estimation of those project choice decisions and the main estimation results.
4 Econometric Specication
We estimate ordered logit models, using the choices made in the nal unconstrained round. The
ordering is given by what we could roughly expect, based on risk preferences; that is, as risk aversion
increases, one could wait to see subjects switch from the uninsured loan to the insured loan and
then to the fallback project: A!C!B. Thus, the dependent variable, yi, which denotes the project
choice by individual i, will take the value of 1, if the fallback project was chosen; 2, if it was the
insured loan project; and 3, if it was the uninsured loan project.
Using the latent utility framework, we dene yi as an unobserved measure of utility for indi-
vidual i:37
yi = X
0
i + i; (4)
where i will be assumed to follow a logistic distribution, and X is the vector of regressors. Thus,
for our three-category ordered model we have that,
yi = j if j 1 < yi  j , j = 1; 2; 3; (5)
with 0 =  1 and 3 = 1; where the 0s indicate the cut points or thresholds that dene the
project choice. Using the prior two equations, the probability of choosing project j can be expressed
as follows:
Pr(yi = j) = Pr(j 1 < yi  j) (6)
= Pr(j 1  X 0i < i  j  X 0i)
= F (j  X 0i)  F (j 1  X 0i);
where F () is the cumulative probability distribution of i. The parameter vector  and the cutpoint
37I am drawing on Cameron and Trivedi (2009) for this part.
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parameters  result from maximizing the following log-likelihood function:
lnL(;  j X) =
NX
i=1
3X
j=1
ln

F (j  X 0i)  F (j 1  X 0i)]yi;j

; (7)
where yi;1; yi;2; yi;3 are three indicator variables with yi;j = 1 if yi = j, and yi;j = 0, otherwise.
We are interested in obtaining the marginal eects of a unit change in the k-th regressor on the
probability of choosing project j, which is given by:
MEi;j;k =
@ Pr(yi = j)
@Xi;k
=

F 0(j 1  X 0i)  F 0(j  X 0i)

k: (8)
We will evaluate the ME0s at the sample means of the regressors (Xi).38 The interpretation of
the marginal eect is straightforward: a MEj;k > (<) 0 means that the probability that project j
is chosen will increase (decrease) by MEj;k as a result of a one unit increase in Xk. We run these
ordered logit regressions with standard errors clustered by the experimentally-constructed-valleys,
in order to correct for a possible intra-cluster correlation. We also include region xed eects in
the regressions in order to control for spatially correlated decisions. The next section discusses the
estimation results, which were run in Stata 10.
4.1 Empirical Analysis
Who would be interested in choosing the insured loan? Those who have a higher valuation of money
when large-scale negative shocks happen, and thus suer more from drastic downturns of money.
We will discuss the eects of wealth, nancial literacy, social connections, choices in the baseline
game, winnings in the low stakes rounds, game eects, risk aversion and nonlinear probability
weighting, on the demand for the insured loan project (project C). We also present the results for
the uninsured loan project (project A), for comparison.
The base specication includes Wealth (in 10,000 Soles), Financial Literacy, and a variable
measuring the degree of social connection existing in the experimentally-constructed valleys, as
independent variables. Wealth includes the value of land and house and our nancial literacy in-
dicator intends to capture the level of comprehension that subjects have about the main features
of the insured and uninsured projects. Crop yield insurance is a new product to all of our experi-
mental subjects, and the prior knowledge of insurance products of any type is very limited in our
sample.39 Recall that the nancial literacy indicator takes values between 0 (meaning that sub-
jects do not know anything about the insured and uninsured loan projects) and 1 (meaning that
subjects know very well those projects), as mentioned above in Subsection 3.1. Moreover, recall
that our subjects were randomly assigned to numbered seats and grouped into \valleys" in each
38In this case, the marginal eect of a dummy variable is computed as the dierence of the predicted value at 1
and the predicted value evaluated at 0.
39Only 36 percent of our subjects have health insurance, mostly oered by the public sector; 10 percent have
accident insurance (mostly car insurance, which is mandatory for public transportation vehicles); and 12 percent
have life insurance. None of our subjects has ever had any type of crop insurance.
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experimental session. Thus, our Agricultural Network variable indicates the number of subjects in
a given valley with whom a person shares information about farming activities.40 This variable
also controls for potentially correlated decisions within each experimental valley.41
In addition, since the choices made in the high stakes insurance game may be correlated with
those made in the high stakes baseline game, we will include a control variable that predicts
choices made in the baseline game. More specically, we include the predicted probability of being
Risk Rationed (i.e., the probability of choosing the fallback project in the baseline game).42 We
will also control for \wealth" eects|that is, subjects may have chosen dierently in the high
stakes depending on how much winnings they had in the prior rounds of the insurance game|by
including the variable Prior Rounds Earnings, which measures the winnings in Soles from the low
stakes rounds in the insurance game. Finally, we will control for the potential existence of a source
of judgment bias called \hot-hand" eect, which may arise from an attempt to discover trends
in past information and results in an overestimation of the autocorrelation in the series of good
or bad events.43 Focusing on negative events, this bias would imply that, for instance, drawing
two consecutive black chips (which means that a very low average yield was drawn in a particular
farming season) may lead subjects to erroneously think that those events are autocorrelated and
would then drive them to rely on a safe project (i.e., either the fallback or the insured loan projects).
This overreaction notion is closely related to the overweighting of probabilities information, in the
sense that the probability of a bad recent event is overvalued, thus resulting in a too optimistic
or too pessimistic behavior. To control for this \hot-hand" eect, we use a dummy variable for
drawing two consecutive black chips in the last two low stakes rounds of the Insurance Game, and we
expect a positive (negative) correlation with the insured loan take-up if there is an overestimation
(underestimation) of the autocorrelation in the series of black chips: once two black chips are drawn,
those subjects overestimating (underestimating) such autocorrelation would (not) expect another
black chip to be drawn in the next rounds, thus judging the insured loan project|that eliminates
the chances of a loan default if a black chip is drawn|more (less) attractive than the uninsured
loan.
Lastly, we include two experimentally measured variables|risk aversion and overweighting of
small probabilities|estimated in Galarza (2009). The Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
coecient was estimated from a binary lottery game in which subjects chose between a relatively
safe lottery and a relatively risky lottery along ten decision rows. Prizes are held constant in each
row, while the probability of the higher prize in each lottery decreases as the game progresses. The
idea of this design is that (unless subjects are extremely risk loving) subjects should start choosing
the safe lottery and switch to the risky lottery before the 10th row, because in that row, the prize
40Including demographic indicators would not change the results signicantly.
41While it could have been interesting to capture the way information is aggregated within dierent valleys and
how it is then translated into decisions under risk, by simply including the size of the agricultural network, we expect
to control for the inuence that the members within a valley may have had on individual's project choices.
42We estimated a Probit regression of the unconstrained nal high stakes round in the baseline game on age (in
years), education (years), gender, and owned land size (hectares).
43Oerman and Sonnemans (2004) report some evidence of the overrreaction resulting from hot-hand eects in
sports and nancial markets. They further desing an experiment to distinguigh between hot-hand and recency
eects, the latter being the bias towards overweighting recent information and underweighting prior beliefs.
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from the risky lottery is for sure greater than that from the safe lottery. In this lottery game,
subjects can switch back and forth between lotteries. Using maximum likelihood and assuming
a linear relationship between individual characteristics (age, education, and geographic location)
and risk preferences, Galarza (2009) nds evidence of risk aversion and probability distortions (in
particular, that subjects overweight small probabilities) that characterizes Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT),44 and that higher education is signicantly correlated with lower risk aversion.
Turning to the regression results shown in Table 5, model (1) [see columns 2-3] includes the risk
estimate under EUT and model (2) [see columns 4-5] includes the risk and overweighting parameters
estimated under CPT as independent variables.45
Consider column 2, which reports the marginal eects for the insured loan (project C) consid-
ering model [1]. We see that wealth is positively correlated with the insured loan take-up, though
the magnitude of its impact is small: with average assets of 20 thousand Soles (see Appendix Table
C.1), this means that a 50 percent increase in assets over such an average would imply an increase
in the probability of choosing the insured loan by almost 4 percent. Financial literacy enters the
regression with a positive sign but an insignicant coecient (p-value is 0.22). Similarly, the size
of the agricultural information network and the predicted probability of being rationed in the base-
line game appear with insignicant coecients in the regression (the p-value in the latter case is
0.164). On the other hand, we do observe evidence of the existence of wealth and \hot-hand"
eects, though in the former case, the coecient is barely signicant (p-value is 0.113); thus, while
earnings obtained during the low stakes rounds of the insurance game are positively correlated
with the insured loan take-up (one more Sol earned is correlated with a 7 percent increase in the
insured loan take-up rate), drawing two more chips in the last low-stake rounds in the insurance
game (a one-percent probability event) would imply a reduction in the insured loan take-up rate by
37 percent. Finally, risk aversion estimates under Expected Utility Theory enter with a negative
and signicant coecient in the regression (p-value is 0.037). Contrary to what classical microe-
conomic theory states, higher risk averse subjects are found to be less prone to choose the insured
loan; a result that may be explained by the fact that those subjects are signicantly less likely to
have understood the intertemporal and dynamic benets of insurance (the correlation coecient
between risk aversion and the nancial literacy variable is {0.26 and is signicant at 1 percent),
thus being less likely to choose the insured loan.
We should mention that in all of the previous cases, the magnitude of the marginal eects
for the demand for the uninsured loan (reported in column 3) are similar but with the opposite
sign to those for the insured loan. Given that the marginal eects add up to zero for the three
categories/projects considered), this means that the marginal eects for the fallback project are
negligible.
44In addition to the curvature of the utility function, a probability weighting function parameter that captures the
subjective probability distortions, is also estimated under CPT. Dened over lottery gains, a nice feature of CPT is
that if no such probability distortions are found, the model collapses to EUT. For a discussion of the main features
of CPT, see Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
45Given the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) one-parameter weighting function used in the estimation performed in
Galarza (2009), a value of 0.7 or less of such a parameter implies such overweighting pattern.
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Table 5: Multiple Choice Model (Ordered Logit
Regressions weighted by the inverse of the risk estimate variance
Marginal eects for the insured loan (C) & uninsured loan (A) are reported
Model (1)1 Model (2)2
Variable Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured
Loan Loan Loan Loan
Wealth (10,000 Soles) 0.036 -0.030 0.047 -0.039
(0.020)* (0.017)* (0.018)** (0.015)**
Financial Literacy Indicator 0.195 -0.166 0.155 -0.130
(0.160) (0.135) (0.162) (0.135)
Number of Peers in Agric Network -0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.006
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018)
Est.Probability of Being Risk Rationed3 0.776 -0.660 0.783 -0.655
(0.558) (0.474) (0.574) (0.489)
Prior Rounds Earnings{Soles4 0.071 -0.061 0.074 -0.062
(0.045)z (0.038) (0.042)* (0.034)*
Two Black Chips, Insurance Game5 -0.369 0.359 -0.347 0.329
(0.183)** (0.204)* (0.213)y (0.227)
CRRA Estimate -0.252 0.214 -0.308 0.257
(0.120)** (0.102)** (0.142)** (0.118)**
Overweighting of Small Probabilities6 n.a. n.a. 0.114 -0.097
(0.121) (0.105)
Mean of dependent variable 0.57 0.34 0.57 0.34
Number of Observations 349 349
Pseudo R-squared 0.063 0.086
n.a.: not applicable. *(**)[***] denotes signicance at 10%(5%)[1%] level. yfzg P-values of 0.103 f0.113g.
Robust standard errors clustered by the experimentally-constructed-valleys are reported in parenthesis.
All regressions include region xed eects.
1 CRRA estimated assuming Expected Utility Theory-EUT with Fechner errors.
2 CRRA estimated assuming cumulative prospect theory-CPT with Fechner errors. 3 Estimated using a
Probit model with age, education, gender and land size as independent variables. 4 In low stakes
Insurance Game. 5 Indicator variable for drawing two black chips in the last two low stakes rounds.
6 Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the weighting function parameter falls below 0.7.
On the other hand, similar results hold when we include a measure of the overweighting of
small probabilities, in addition to the estimate of the curvature of the utility function parame-
ter, which characterizes Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). As reported in column 4 of Table
5 (marginal eects for the insured loan, project C), in general, the impact of the regressors that
resulted statistically signicant under EUT becomes greater under CPT. In particular, wealth turns
highly signicant (p-value is 0.010), and its marginal eect is more responsive than under EUT;
similarly, the marginal eect of earnings in cash from the low stakes rounds of the insurance game
increases slightly and becomes signicant (p-value is 0.077). In contrast, the variable capturing
\hot-hand" eects|drawing two consecutive black chips|loses signicance due to the inclusion of
the overweighting-of-small-probabilities indicator.
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Finally, in interpreting the eect of the curvature of the utility function parameter, we should
note that under CPT, there is an additional sources of risk aversion|the parameter of the proba-
bility weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Thus, for a given curvature of the utility
function, risk aversion is oset by overweighting of small probabilities (Fox and Poldrack, 2009).
This explains why the marginal eect of the curvature parameter and that of the variable reecting
the overweighting of small probabilities have opposite signs: while a higher risk aversion estimate
is associated with a lower demand for the insured loan by 31 percent (signicant at 5 percent
level), overweighting small probabilities is correlated with a 11 percent increase in the probability
of choosing the insured loan, though its marginal eect is not signicant (p-value is 0.346).
5 Conclusion
In a context of collateral-constrained formal credit markets, the introduction of insurance can help
enhance the demand for credit by reducing the fear of losing collateral that prevents potential
borrowers from taking loans. This paper provides experimental evidence of such desired credit
crowding-in eect of insurance in rural Peru. Framing our experiments to recreate a similar en-
vironment to the choices and outcomes that farmers have in real life, we started with a Baseline
Game where subjects had to choose between a fallback (safe) production project or produce using
an uninsured working capital loan (risky project). We then introduced a third project|producing
cotton with an insured loan| which allows us to measure the eect of insurance on the demand for
loans. We thus nd that while about a quarter of our subjects are risk rationed, meaning that they
chose to do the fallback project in the baseline game, about 60 percent of those subjects switched
to the insured loan project when it was available.
Overall, in the Insurance Game, more than 50 percent of the subjects chose the insured loan
during the high stakes rounds. Given that this insurance contract eliminates by construction the
chance of loan default, this demand is likely to reect the fear of losing collateral when one is
unable to repay a loan. One could suspect that this very high insurance take-up rate may simply
reect subjects' desire to \try that new product" out of curiosity. There are two reasons to believe
that this was not the case. First, the insured loan take-up does not uctuate much even during
the low stakes rounds. Second, and more interestingly, using contingent valuation questions in
the post-experiment survey, we verify that indeed about 55 percent of farmers indicated that they
would be willing to buy the insured loan contract with the premium of 150 Soles per hectare.
On the other hand, the econometric results of the main predictors of the demand for the insured
loan show that, controlling for choices in the baseline game and some \game" eects, wealth is
positively correlated with a greater probability of choosing the insured loan project, while higher
risk averse subjects are found to be less prone to choose the insured loan. This last nding seems
counterintuitive, but may be explained by the fact that higher risk averse subjects are signicantly
less likely to have understood the intertemporal and dynamic benets of insurance, thus being less
likely to choose the insured loan. The negative eect of risk aversion on the demand for the insured
loan is reinforced when we account for the subjective probability distortions in the regression. There
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is certainly work to do in order to fully understand this result; but nonetheless, this evidence should
provide some clues to explore some departures from the standard microeconomic theory. In this
line of research, examining the importance of psychological factors behind the decisions to adopt
innovative nancial instruments will likely prove to be useful.
This paper contributes to the existing literature about the use of behavioral experiments to
predict nancial decisions made in a risky environment. A novel feature of our experimental design
is that it involves choices over alternative projects related to agricultural production decisions|
a fallback, safe production plan, taking up an uninsured loan to nance agricultural production,
and taking up a loan bundled with crop insurance|whose end-of-season prots depend on the
realizations of two random shocks, one intended to reect the eects of covariate, systemic variables
and the other, the eects of idiosyncratic factors. We then use the random incentive mechanism,
which consists in picking one of the project choices made by subjects at random, in order to elicit
true preferences. Our experimental design can also be used to educate potential beneciaries about
virtually any new nancial product, with some adaptation.
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Appendix A. Information Shared with Subjects
1. Number and color of chips by type of valley-wide average yields (VAYs): black, red, white,
blue, green
2. Historical valley-wide average cotton yields: 1986-2006 (bar graph)
3. Project A (cotton with loan) payos for the normal individual luck (luck dimension not
shown) by type of VAY
4. Example of calculating the payos for the normal individual luck (luck dimension not shown)
with normal VAY
5. Number and color of balls by type of individual luck: purple, white, yellow
6. Project A's payos (by type of luck and category of VAY)
7. Project B's payos (by type of luck and category of VAY)
8. Project A's and B's payos (by type of luck and category of VAY) on the same page
9. Project C's payos (by type of luck and category of VAY)
10. Project A's, B's & C's payos (by type of luck and category of VAY) on the same page
fEnd of Farming Gamesg
11. Maximum and minimum prizes of lotteries
12. Lotteries' payos for decision row 2
13. Lotteries' payos for decision row 8 (symmetric to 2)
14. Lotteries' payos for decision rows 2 and 8 (together)
15. Practice game sheet for binary lottery game (ten decision rows)
16. Game sheet for high-stake binary lottery game (ten decision rows)
fEnd of Lottery Gameg
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Appendix B. Summary of Experimental Procedures in Farming
Games
The following is the structure of the farming games conducted in Pisco.
 Entry survey
 Introduction of the experimental session
 Presentation of the experiment: goals
 Description of project A: cotton with loan
{ Description of Covariate shock: valley-wide average yield (VAY), slide
 Examples of how dierent colored chips represent distinct types of VAY
 Example of how dierent colored chips imply dierent prots, slide
 Example of how the payo for the normal VAY was calculated, slide
{ Description of Idiosyncratic shock: individual luck, slide
 Example of how dierent colored balls (and dierent colored chips) imply dierent
prots for project A (uninsured loan)
{ Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual luck (see prots), slide
 Description of project B: cotton without loan (fallback), slide
{ Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual luck (see prots)
 Comparison of outcomes in projects A and B, slide
{ Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual luck (compare prots if project were
chosen A versus prots if project B were chosen)
 Play six rounds of low stakes, baseline game (A versus B)
{ Payments are calculated and shown to subjects
 Play six rounds of high stakes, baseline game (A versus B)
{ Payments are calculated and shown to subjects
 Description of project C: cotton with loan and index insurance, slide
{ A salient feature: no default loans under any covariate shock or idiosyncratic shock
{ Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual luck (see prots)
 Comparison of outcomes in projects A, B, and C, slide
{ Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual luck (compare prots if project were
chosen A versus prots if projects B or C were chosen)
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 Play six rounds of low stakes, insurance game (A versus B versus C)
{ Payments are calculated and shown to subjects
 Play six rounds of high stakes, insurance game (A versus B versus C)
{ Payments are calculated and shown to subjects
 End of Farming Experiments
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Appendix C. Tables
Table C.1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Dependent variable
Insured loan take-up rate (high stakes) 0.57 0.49 378
Demographics and Education
Age (years) 54.9 13.3 367
Aged less than 40 0.14 0.35 367
Aged between than 40 and 50 0.19 0.39 367
Aged between than 50 and 60 0.33 0.47 367
Aged over 60 0.33 0.47 367
Female (Yes=1) 0.27 0.44 367
Education (years) 6.33 4.11 365
Illiterate 0.05 0.23 365
Some primary school 0.51 0.50 365
Some secondary school 0.34 0.47 365
Completed higher than secondary school 0.09 0.29 365
Financial literacy indicator1 0.54 0.20 378
Agriculture and Assets
Farming experience (years) 23.9 12.7 368
Size of owned agricultural plot (hectares) 6.03 5.57 367
Size of sown land (hectares)2 5.01 4.13 365
Cotton yields (quintals per hectare)2 46.8 14.8 293
Self-reported value of owned ag plot (000 Soles) 7.43 8.78 307
Self-reported value of house (000 Soles) 15.92 21.0 321
Self-reported value of assets (000 Soles)3 20.42 21.8 362
Networks and Credit
Talked to somebody in her \valley" about farming(Yes=1) 0.67 0.47 378
Number of \valley" members in her agricultural network 1.73 1.61 378
Has ever been a local authority (Yes=1) 0.39 0.49 365
Belongs to a farmer association (Yes=1) 0.29 0.46 364
Got credit for farming activities (Yes=1)2 0.61 0.49 378
Got formal credit (Yes=1) 0.39 0.49 232
Got credit from cotton mills (Yes=1) 0.27 0.45 232
Experimental Variables
Risk rationed (Baseline Game) (Yes=1) 0.24 0.43 378
Risk parameter estimate, EUT4 0.45 0.29 365
Risk parameter estimate, CPT4 0.74 0.32 365
Probability weighting parameter estimate, CPT5 0.54 0.21 365
Overweighting small probabilities (Yes=1), CPT5 0.80 0.40 365
Drew two black chips,last low-stake rounds Insurance Game 0.02 0.13 378
Winnings from low stakes Insurance Game (Soles) 3.04 0.85 378
1 Indicator calculated using knowledge of insurance and loan project, as well as a self-reported degree of
comprehension. 2 It refers to the 2007-2008 farming season. 3 Wealth includes the values of land & house.
4 EUT (CPT): Risk estimate assuming Expected Utility Theory (Cumulative Prospect Theory).
5 Overweighting means that the probability weighting parameter is less than or equal to 0.7.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics by Project Choice in Final Unconstrained Round
Baseline Game
Name Uninsured Loan (A) Fallback (B) T-Test
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (A)=(B)
Demographics and Education
Age (years) 54.6 0.80 278 55.9 1.39 89 -0.80
Young (age < 40) 0.14 0.02 279 0.12 0.04 89 0.48
Middle (age: [50-60]) 0.34 0.03 279 0.33 0.05 89 0.19
Old (age > 60) 0.33 0.03 279 0.36 0.05 89 -0.57
Female 0.24 0.03 279 0.36 0.05 89 -2.15**
Education (years) 6.35 0.25 279 6.27 0.45 86 0.17
Illiterate 0.05 0.21 279 0.09 0.29 86 -1.37*
Some primary school 0.51 0.50 279 0.50 0.50 86 0.20
Some secondary school 0.35 0.48 279 0.30 0.46 86 0.85
Higher than second. school 0.09 0.29 279 0.10 0.31 86 -0.40
Financial literacy indicator 0.55 0.20 286 0.51 0.20 92 1.49*
Agriculture and Assets
Farm experience (years) 23.4 12.6 279 25.4 13.1 89 -1.27
Size of owned land (Has) 6.28 0.36 278 5.24 4.17 89 1.85**
Size of sown land (Has)1 5.23 4.15 277 4.32 4.02 88 1.83**
Cotton yields (QQ/ Ha.)1 47.4 14.4 230 44.8 16.2 63 1.12
Land value (000 Soles) 7.64 9.39 235 6.76 6.42 72 0.91
House value (000 Soles) 15.44 19.65 241 17.35 24.32 80 -0.63
Wealth (000 Soles) 20.14 20.84 274 21.30 24.83 88 -0.40
Networks and Credit
Belongs to ag network 0.71 0.45 287 0.56 0.50 91 2.56***
# members in ag network 1.82 1.60 287 1.44 1.62 91 1.97**
Has been local authority 0.40 0.49 277 0.35 0.48 88 0.88
Belongs to farm association 0.27 0.45 277 0.36 0.48 87 -1.47*
Got credit for farming activities 0.66 0.48 286 0.48 0.50 92 3.01***
Got formal credit 0.36 0.48 188 0.50 0.51 44 -1.71**
Got credit from a cotton mill 0.31 0.46 188 0.14 0.35 44 2.76***
Experimental Outcomes
Risk estimate under EUT2 0.44 0.30 280 0.46 0.29 85 0.48
Risk estimate under CPT2 0.73 0.33 280 0.77 0.31 85 0.92
Prob. weighting parameter est., CPT 0.54 0.21 280 0.52 0.20 85 0.81
Overweighting small probabilities, CPT3 0.78 0.42 280 0.87 0.34 85 -1.86**
Drew two black chips, low-stake rounds4 0.02 0.13 287 0.01 0.10 91 0.43
Winnings, low stakes Insurance Game5 3.07 0.88 287 2.96 0.73 91 1.07
 () []: Signicant at 10% (5%) [1%] level. T-test assumes unequal variances.
1 It refers to the 2007-2008 farming season.
2 EUT (CPT): Risk estimate assuming Expected Utility Theory (Cumulative Prospect Theory).
3 Overweighting means that the probability weighting parameter under CPT is less than or equal to 0.7.
4 In last two low-stake rounds of Insurance Game. 5 Expressed in Soles.
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Table C.3: Summary Statistics by Project Choice in Final Unconstrained Round
Insurance Game
Name Insured Loan (C) Uninsured Loan (A) T-Test Fallback (B) T-Test
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (C)=(A) Mean S.D. N (C)=(B)
Demographics and Education
Age (years) 53.8 13.2 210 56.0 56.5 124 -1.51* 57.9 14.6 33 -1.53*
Young 0.15 0.36 211 0.13 0.34 124 0.56 0.09 0.29 33 1.07
Middle 0.35 0.48 211 0.31 0.46 124 0.83 0.33 0.48 33 0.19
Old 0.29 0.45 211 0.37 0.49 124 -1.44* 0.45 0.51 33 -1.72*
Female 0.26 0.44 211 0.26 0.44 124 0.05 0.33 0.48 33 -0.82
Education (years) 6.8 4.1 210 5.8 4.1 122 2.08** 5.6 3.9 33 1.61*
Illiterate 0.04 0.20 210 0.07 0.25 122 -0.87 0.12 0.33 33 -1.32*
Some primary school 0.47 0.50 210 0.58 0.50 122 -2.03** 0.52 0.50 33 -0.51
Some second.school 0.39 0.49 210 0.27 0.45 122 2.19** 0.30 0.47 33 0.94
> second.school 0.10 0.31 210 0.08 0.28 122 0.70 0.06 0.24 33 0.94
Financial literacy 0.56 0.19 216 0.51 0.21 129 2.09** 0.50 0.22 33 1.46*
Agriculture and Assets
Farm experience1 23.4 12.7 211 24.2 12.1 124 -0.53 26.0 14.9 33 -0.93
Size, owned land2;3 6.1 6.3 210 6.3 4.8 124 -0.35 4.9 3.1 33 1.69**
Size of sown land2;3 5.05 4.2 210 5.2 4.0 123 -0.41 3.8 4.2 32 1.53*
Cotton yields-QQ/Ha2 47.9 15.2 163 46.3 14.7 106 0.89 41.9 11.5 24 2.31**
Land value4 7.73 10.90 173 7.30 5.01 107 0.44 6.08 4.07 27 1.44*
House value4 18.65 25.76 185 12.37 16.48 108 2.93*** 11.48 9.52 28 2.75***
Wealth4 23.13 26.66 207 17.08 12.34 124 2.80*** 15.67 10.86 31 2.78***
Networks and Credit
Belongs to agricult.
network 0.69 0.46 216 0.70 0.46 129 -0.15 0.48 0.51 33 2.18**
# members netwk 1.75 1.58 216 1.82 1.65 129 -0.42 1.27 1.63 33 1.56*
Has ever been a
local authority 0.39 0.49 209 0.36 0.48 124 0.53 0.50 0.51 32 -1.12
Belongs to a farm
association 0.30 0.46 208 0.27 0.45 124 0.56 0.28 0.46 32 0.25
Got credit 0.59 0.49 216 0.70 0.46 129 -2.00** 0.42 0.50 33 1.88**
Formal credit 0.41 0.49 128 0.38 0.49 90 0.42 0.21 0.43 14 1.58*
From cotton mill 0.27 0.44 128 0.27 0.44 90 -0.02 0.43 0.51 14 -1.14
Experimental Outcomes
Risk rationed5 0.24 0.43 216 0.16 0.36 129 1.98** 0.58 0.50 33 -3.64***
Risk estimate EUT 0.42 0.29 210 0.47 0.29 122 -1.59* 0.51 0.30 33 -1.53*
Risk estimate CPT 0.71 0.33 210 0.78 0.32 122 -1.85** 0.79 0.28 33 -1.56*
Prob.weighting param. 0.55 0.21 210 0.52 0.21 122 1.43* 0.51 0.18 33 1.38*
Overweight low prob.6 0.78 0.41 210 0.81 0.39 122 -0.67 0.88 0.33 33 -1.52*
Drew two black chips7 0.005 0.07 216 0.03 0.17 129 -1.65* 0.03 0.17 33 0.84
Winnings, low stakes8 3.11 0.79 216 3.06 0.95 129 0.48 2.58 0.63 33 4.31***
* (**) [***] Signicant at 10% (5%) [1%] level. T-tests assume unequal variances.
1 Units are years. 2 For farming season 2007-2008. 3 In hectares. 4 Units are thousand Soles. 5 In the
Baseline Game.6 Overweighting means that the probability weighting parameter is less than 0.7.
7 In last two low-stake rounds Insurance Game. 8 In low stakes Insurance Game(expressed in Soles).
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Appendix D. Surveys
D.1 Entry Survey
I. General Information
1. Name
2. Gender
3. What is your age?
4. How many children younger than 15 years of age currently live in your household?
5. How many completed years of education do you have?
6. The person with the most education in your household, how many completed years of
education does he or she have?
7. How many years have you dedicated to agricultural activities?
8. How many hectares does your household own?
9. How many hectares did you work in the past year?
10. How much do you think you would have to pay to rent a hectare of land with similar
characteristics to those of your principal cotton parcel?
11.4. In the years (… ), did you…11.1 Did
you
plant
cotton in
the
years
(… )?
11.3
Do you believe that
your cotton yields in
the years () were () than
those of other farmers
in your neighborhood?
A.
Become
sick or
injured?
B.
Suffer any
kind of
theft?
(Seeds,
cotton,
pesticides,
etc.)
C.
Suffer a
problem
with the
climate?
D.
Suffer an
infestation
or blight
in your
cotton
crop?
E.
Have
problems
with the
irrigation
infrastructure
in your area?
Row by
row,
mark
with an
X the
space
that
correspo
nds to
the
subject’s
answer. ye
s
N
o
11.2
What
were
your
cotton
yields in
the
years
()?
(QQ x
Ha)
Highe
r
Equal Less Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
2007-
2008
2006-
2007
2005-
2006
12. During the past 5 years, did you receive any type of technical assistance (TA) or training
(T) related to the production of cotton?
If no, continue to question 14. If yes, continue to 13.
13. Describe the last two TA or T that you received?
From whom did
you receive the TA
or T?
>> Table 1
The TA or T
was?
>> Table 2
TA 1
TA 2
T 1
T 2
Table 1
1. Cotton gin
2. Other private business
3. NGO
4. Ministry of Agriculture
5. Other? Who?_________
________
______________________________
Table 2
1.Very  beneficial
2. beneficial
3. Somewhat
beneficial
4. Not beneficial
II. Social Capital
14. Are you or have you ever been any kind of authority of some association, in your community,
or irrigation commission?
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15. Do you currently belong to any association of farmers?
III. Insurance
Row by row,
mark with an X
the space that
corresponds to
the subject’s
answer.
16.1
Do you
know
what ()
insurance
is?
yes, quest.
16.2
No, quest.
16.3
16.2
Do you have to pay
for (… ) insurance?
16.3
Do you or
does anyone
in your
household
have (… )
insurance?
yes, Q. 16.4
No, Q. 16.5
16.4
If so, does
this
person
pay for
the (… )
insurance?
16.5
Do you know
who delivers
the services of
() insurance?
16.6
Only if they
respond
YES to
question
16.1
Do you
know what
benefits you
receive from
(… )
insurance?
(Table 3)
Th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
Th
e 
Ca
ja
 ru
ra
l o
r a
 b
an
k
In
su
ra
nc
e 
co
m
pa
ny
D
o 
no
t k
no
w
Yes No Yes No Doesn
’t
know
Yes No Yes No
Health
Accidents
Life/burial/
funeral
Debt
Other?  Which?
Table 3
1. Free or less expensive medical attention in case of an
accident
2. Gives my family money should I pass away.
3. Medical attention in a hospital
4. Pays my debts if I pass them to my next of kin
5. Pays for my burial and/or funeral,
17. Would you be interested in paying a monthly premium to an institution in exchange for
receiving a payment ONLY in the case that you:
Are ill or injured
Suer an infestation or blight in your crops
Suer a problem with the climate (e.g., drought)
Suer problems with the irrigation infrastructure
D.2 Exit Survey
I. Networks
1. How many people in the group in which you are seated do you know?
2. How many people in the group have you spoken with about farming activities (e.g., what to
plant, input use, etc.)?
II. Assets
3. The house in which you live is
Owned by you Owned by your parents/in-laws Owned by others Rented (if rented,
continue to question 5)
4. How much do you think you would have to pay to buy a house similar to yours?
Amount Soles
5. Do you possess one of the following consumer goods?
Car or light truck Motorcycle Heavy truck Tractor
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III. Credit
6. If you applied for a loan at the local urban or rural Caja or a bank, do you think they would
give it to you?
7. If you applied for a loan at a cotton gin, do you think they would give it to you?
8. If you applied for a loan from an informal moneylender, do you think they would give it to
you?
9. In the years 2007-2008, did you obtain a loan in order to pay for your costs of production?
(If no, continue to question 11)
10. From whom did you obtain this loan?
Bank or Caja Cotton gin Informal lender
IV. Agricultural Insurance
11. Do you think that the instructions we gave you today prior to today's activities were:
Very dicult Dicult Easy Very easy
12. Do you remember what happened if you obtained a loan without insurance and could not
repay the loan?
What happened?
13. The indemnication that the insurance paid you depended on the average yields in the
valley?
14. Did it depend on individual luck?
15. If someone were to oer you insurance similar to what we saw in activity 1 for the next
agricultural year, would you be interested in buying it?
16. Would you be interested in paying XX Soles per hectare for insurance similar to what we
saw in activity 1 (i.e., farming experiments)?
(   ) YES >> Mark with an X the
maximum he/she would be willing to pay
(   ) NO >> Mark with an X the
maximum he/she would be willing to pay
S/. XX+25 S/. XX-25
S/. XX+50 S/. XX-50
S/. XX+75 S/. XX-75
S/. XX+100 S/. XX-100
More less
XX was set at 100, and 150, and 200 Soles.
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